Shuttle Foam Loss Linked to EPA Regs

[Klaus]

Shuttle Foam Loss Linked to EPA Regs

Thursday, July 28, 2005



As recently as last month, NASA had been warned that foam insulation on the space shuttle's external fuel tank could sheer off as it did in the 2003 Columbia disaster - a problem that has plagued space shuttle flights since NASA switched to a non-Freon-based type of foam insulation to comply with Clinton administration Environmental Protection Agency regulations.

"Despite exhaustive work and considerable progress over the past 2-1/2 years, NASA has been unable to eliminate the possibility of dangerous pieces of foam and ice from breaking off the external fuel tank and striking the shuttle at liftoff," the agency's Return-to-Flight Task Force said just last month, according to The Associated Press.

But instead of returning the much safer, politically incorrect, Freon-based foam for Discovery's launch, the space agency tinkered with the application process, changing "the way the foam was applied to reduce the size and number of air pockets," according to Newsday.

"NASA chose to stick with non-Freon-based foam insulation on the booster rockets, despite evidence that this type of foam causes up to 11 times as much damage to thermal tiles as the older, Freon-based foam," warned space expert Robert Garmong just nine months ago.

In fact, though NASA never acknowledged that its environmentally friendly, more brittle foam had anything to do with the foam sheering problem, the link had been well documented within weeks of the Columbia disaster.

In February 2003, for instance, the Philadelphia Inquirer reported:
"NASA engineers have known for at least five years that insulating foam could peel off the space shuttle's external fuel tanks and damage the vital heat-protecting tiles that the space agency says were the likely 'root cause' of Saturday's shuttle disaster."

In a 1997 report, NASA mechanical systems engineer Greg Katnik "noted that the 1997 mission, STS-87, was the first to use a new method of 'foaming' the tanks, one designed to address NASA's goal of using environmentally friendly products. The shift came as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency was ordering many industries to phase out the use of Freon, an aerosol propellant linked to ozone depletion and global warming," the Inquirer said.

Before the environmentally friendly new insulation was used, about 40 of the spacecraft's 26,000 ceramic tiles would sustain damage in missions. However, Katnik reported that NASA engineers found 308 "hits" to Columbia after a 1997 flight.

A "massive material loss on the side of the external tank" caused much of the damage, Katnik wrote in an article in Space Team Online.
He called the damage "significant." One hundred thirty-two hits were bigger than 1 inch in diameter, and some slashes were as long as 15 inches.

"As recently as last September [2002], a retired engineering manager for Lockheed Martin, the contractor that assembles the tanks, told a conference in New Orleans that developing a new foam to meet environmental standards had 'been much more difficult than anticipated,'" the Inquirer said.

The engineer, who helped design the thermal protection system, said that switching from the Freon foam "resulted in unanticipated program impacts, such as foam loss during flight."

http://www.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2005/7/28/93055.shtml

[Klaus]

Did Environmental Regulations Cause Space Shuttle Tragedies?

Written By: William L. Anderson
Published In: Environment News
Publication Date: September 1, 2003
Publisher: The Heartland Institute

Most people can remember intimate details of what they were doing when they first heard the space shuttle Challenger had exploded. To compound the tragedy, millions of schoolchildren across the country watched the event in shocked amazement.

The ?teacher in space? effort NASA hoped would be a public relations boon to the shuttle program instead exploded with the shuttle as teacher Christa McCauliffe of New Hampshire was among the seven astronauts who perished when the shuttle disintegrated miles above the Earth.

NASA went on to record many successful space flights after the Challenger disaster. Then the program once again was shocked into reality when Columbia blew up in flames just minutes before landing, killing all seven astronauts aboard.

Even more depressing: The roots of both disasters were planted in the federal government?s environmental policies. Misguided policies not only killed 14 U.S. astronauts, but killed them in a most horrible and public way.

Faulty Foam Mandated by EPA

As recent news reports have pointed out, the wreck of the Columbia was almost certainly due to a chunk of insulating foam prying loose and hitting some heat-protecting tiles, leaving the spacecraft vulnerable to intense heat upon re-entry into the Earth?s atmosphere.

That is all the mainstream news--and NASA--have been willing to report. What they have not said is that the foam in use at the time was a substitute, replacing a material that had previously worked well but contained Freon, a chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) banned because of the ozone depletion scare.

As Cato Institute adjunct scholar Steven Milloy reports, NASA could have sought an exemption. Freon, after all, is inert and nontoxic, and its connection to ozone depletion is tenuous at best. However, having been burned by EPA once before, NASA succumbed to what Milloy calls ?PC foam.?

Milloy writes, ?PC foam was an immediate problem. The first mission with PC foam resulted in 11 times more damaged thermal tiles on Columbia than the previous mission with Freon-based foam.?

The damage was obvious and quite severe. Milloy writes that following the 1997 Columbia mission, ?more than 100 tiles were damaged beyond repair, well over the normal count of 40.?

Milloy points out EPA did in fact exempt NASA from the CFC reduction requirement in 2001, but NASA decided to continue using the ?environment-friendly? foam it by then had been using for several years.

Exemptions Denied

The Challenger explosion occurred in January 1986. As nearly everyone familiar with the catastrophe knows, a set of O-rings that was supposed to keep hot gases trapped in the rocket carrying the shuttle failed, with the fuel quickly leaking out and igniting into a fireball shortly after takeoff.

It was an unusually cold morning at Cape Canaveral, too cold for the O-rings to perform properly. That is well known. What most people do not know is that the material used to make the O-rings was a substitute, replacing a product EPA had banned because it contained asbestos.

The original O-rings used between the rocket joints came from an over-the-counter putty that had been used safely and effectively for a long time. However, in its war against the use of asbestos anywhere, anytime, EPA forbade NASA to use the product at all. NASA sought an exemption, which EPA refused, ultimately leading to the Challenger disaster 17 years later.

A Recurring Theme

In normal situations, this would be a scandal of epic proportions: By requiring the use of unsafe materials, a government agency caused the very public deaths of 14 individuals. Had a private firm permitted such unsafe working conditions, the situation would merit a New York Times investigative report.

Scientifically unsound environmental policy can be disastrous. Granted, we are talking about the lives of ?only? 14 people, compared to the hundreds of thousands who have died of malaria following the banning of DDT, which once effectively killed the mosquitoes that carry the disease.

But whether we speak of 14 astronauts, or hundreds of thousands of people in a remote African nation, we speak of the same thing: death by environmentalism.

http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artId=12801

[KenP]

The Clinton family is to blame for all our ills.

[deserth3]

Mostly you just have to be careful when there are cigars around.

[Aubs]

Kind of extreme there. DDT was still used, but it became so ineffective that most just pollutes the environment. There are other, more expensive, yet more effective methods of insect control. DDT was kinda bad for people anyway, being an organochlorine which accumlated in fatty tissues. That meant that we ended up with high concentration in our bodies. I was born in 1984, 14 after DDT's death in the US, but I probably have a significant amount in my body left over from it's useage.

Anyway, on the subject, if the freon based foam worked, they should have continued using it. I'll admit that the foam issue is a problem. But the shuttle program is really a billion problems that are just waiting to appear. Something new could happen on any launch, and then that would be the focus of attention. Basically, space travel, especially shuttle travel, is a dangerous proposition. There are always risks, but they're acceptable risks. The foam is obviously an acceptable risk. NASA could risk losing the entire shuttle program if this shuttle fails. I think the foam is just an issue in the press. NASA has many other systems to worry about, and the foam is probably one of their lessor concerns.

[Agriv8r]

Originally Posted by Aubs

I think the foam is just an issue in the press. NASA has many other systems to worry about, and the foam is probably one of their lessor concerns.

what they need is for someone to chip a nail on a seat support or maybe something a little less dramatic than a chipped nail to become the new media focus for today.